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Using survey data to judge how analyst forecasts are related to 
evaluations of companies’ industry competitiveness, strategic 
choices, and internal capabilities, the authors found that analyst 
forecasts are associated with many of the factors that money 
managers rate as important in their assessments of analyst 
contributions. They also found wide variation in ratings consistency 
across variables among analysts covering the same company. On 
average, consistency is higher for sell-side analysts than for buy-
side analysts.  
Although extensive research has been conducted on analysts’ earnings 
forecasts and recommendations (see Bradshaw 2010; Schipper 1991), relatively 
little has been written about the factors that underlie them.1 In our study, we 
examined which industry, leadership, and company factors are related to 
analysts’ forecasts of financial and stock performance. We also examined 
whether analysts covering the same company make consistent assessments of 
its industry, leadership, and company capabilities. 
Prior Research 
                                                 
1Previous academic studies have shown that analysts incorporate public disclosures on 
company risk, competitive changes, competitive positioning, and management into their 
analyses (see Previts, Bricker, Robinson, and Young 1994; Rogers and Grant 1997; Ramnath, 
Rock, and Shane 2008). In addition, Asquith, Mikhail, and Au (2005) found that stock prices 
react to qualitative information in analysts’ reports. What remains unclear from these studies 
is which factors are most important for analysts’ overall assessments of companies’ expected 
future performance. 2 
Prior research suggests that three primary factors drive company performance: 
industry characteristics, company characteristics, and leadership 
characteristics. Wasserman, Nohria, and Anand (2010) found that industry 
characteristics accounted for 15.5 percent of the variation in company 
performance, company characteristics 32.8 percent, and leadership 
characteristics 13.5 percent. 
Industry Characteristics.  
Porter (1985) and McGahan and Porter (1997) demonstrated that a 
company’s performance is influenced by the growth and structure of its 
industry. A growing industry can lift all boats. In addition, an industry’s 
attractiveness is affected by rivalry among its existing companies, entry 
barriers faced by potential competitors, the power of customers and suppliers, 
and the threat of substitute products or services. 
Company Characteristics.  
Porter (1980) showed that companies within an industry earn differential 
returns if they develop a distinct competitive advantage, either by having a 
lower cost structure than their competitors or by offering a superior 
product/service. 
Others argue that simply developing a strategy is not enough. To be 
successful, companies must also be able to execute their strategies (Galbraith 
and Kazanjian 1986; Kaplan and Norton 2008; Joyce, Nohria, and Robertson 
2003), communicate their strategies effectively (Bower 1970), and adjust their 
strategies on the basis of competitors’ actions (Brandenburger and Nalebuff 
1996). In addition, strategy execution and company performance are affected 
by organizational culture (Kotter and Heskett 1992; Huselid 1995; Joyce, 
Nohria, and Robertson 2003). 
Finally, ever since Schumpeter (1942), management theorists have 
argued that innovative companies are consistently more successful than non-
innovative companies (Henderson and Clark 1990; Christensen 1997; 3 
Utterback 1994; Mansfield 1995; Mowery and Rosenberg 1998; Tushman and 
O’Reilly 2002). 
Leadership Characteristics.  
Management quality is frequently cited as a key determinant of company 
performance, both through its effect on decision-making and execution (Kotter 
1990; Hackman and Wageman 1995; Kaplan, Klebanov, and Sorensen 2008; 
Bass 2008; Finkelstein, Hambrick, and Cannella 2009) and through the 
promotion of strong governance (Carter and Lorsch 2004). 
Survey and Sample 
As we have seen, prior research suggests that in forecasting a company’s 
performance, analysts are likely to consider such factors as the growth and 
competitiveness of its industry, its strategic positioning, execution of strategy, 
innovation, leadership, culture, and financial resources. To examine which of 
these factors are related to analyst forecasts, we designed a survey that asked 
analysts to provide forecasts of revenue and earnings growth, gross margins, 
and stock price appreciation, as well as ratings on the factors, for up to three 
companies that they covered. The survey questions are presented in Exhibit 1. 
We identified our survey sample by searching databases maintained by 
the Dow Jones News Service, Institutional Investor, LexisNexis, the National 
Association of Securities Dealers, Nelson’s Directories, and Yahoo! Finance for 
the names and addresses of analysts who worked at investment banks, 
brokerage firms, research boutiques, and money management firms in the 
United States, Europe, Asia, and Latin America. From these sources, we 
constructed a list of 5,090 analysts, whom we invited to participate in our 
online survey during two periods: December 2004–April 2005 and March 2006–
July 2006. 
Analysts were first asked to identify the country/region and major 
industry that they covered (from a list provided in the survey) and then to 4 
select up to three companies from that region/industry with which they were 
most familiar (again, from a list provided in the survey). Only companies listed 
on the major stock indices were included. For example, in the United States, 
only companies listed on the S&P 500 Index were included. 
Analysts were asked to complete the survey questions for each company 
they selected by using a Likert (i.e., unidimensional) scale of 1 to 5, a 
commonly used and widely recommended approach for rating beliefs and 
attitudes. For Questions 1–5, which asked analysts to rate an industry without 
any benchmark, 1 signified a rating of “highly unlikely,” 2 “somewhat unlikely,” 
3 “neither likely nor unlikely,” 4 “somewhat likely,” and 5 “highly likely.” For 
example, Question 2 asked, “In the next 12 months, how likely [is] the following 
in each company’s business environment: Greater price competition?” A rating 
of 1 indicated that the analyst believed that increased price competition in the 
industry in the next 12 months was “highly unlikely,” whereas a 5 indicated 
the belief that it was “highly likely.” 
For Questions 6–20, which requested a comparison of companies with 
their peers, 1 signified a rating of “significantly less,” 2 “somewhat less,” 3 “the 
same,” 4 “somewhat more,” and 5 “significantly more.” For example, Question 
10 asked, “Relative to its peers, does the company have a clear and well-
communicated strategy?” A rating of 1 indicated that the analyst believed the 
company’s strategy was “significantly less” clear than that of its peers, whereas 
a 5 indicated that the company’s strategy was viewed as “significantly more” 
clear than that of its peers. 
We received survey responses from 967 analysts, representing a 19 
percent response rate.2 Participants provided 2,179 usable survey responses 
for 837 companies.3 Our sample included 1,484 observations from 638 sell-
                                                 
2Many studies have reported similar response rates for external online surveys. For example, 
comparing internet and mail survey response rates, Kaplowitz, Hadlock, and Levine (2004) 
documented a 20 percent response rate for e-mail-only surveys. 
3We were unable to use 774 responses because analysts did not complete all the questions 
needed to construct the independent and dependent variables of interest. 5 
side analysts and 643 observations from 329 buy-side analysts.4 Table 1 
provides a summary of the sample analysts and companies by region and 
industry; 40 percent of the responding analysts were from the United States, 
27 percent were from Europe, 25 percent from Asia Pacific, and 8 percent from 
Latin America. Key covered industries included finance (22 percent), 
noncyclical consumer goods (14 percent), cyclical services (13 percent), and 
information technology (11 percent). 
We conducted several tests to assess the integrity of the survey data. We 
used the first one, a Likert summated rating test, to determine whether sample 
analysts systematically selected companies for which they had either positive 
or negative opinions. If an analyst responded with 1 to all 20 questions, the 
summated rating score was 20; a response of 5 to every question generated a 
summated score of 100 (5  20). For the overall sample, the average summated 
score was 69, indicating that analysts selected companies that they expected to 
perform well, which is consistent with prior research (see Dugar and Nathan 
1995; McNichols and O’Brien 1997; Lin and McNichols 1998; Cowen, 
Groysberg, and Healy 2006). Summed scores did not differ significantly for 
analysts from different geographic regions or industries or across the two 
surveys. 
In addition, we examined the data to assess whether the ratings made 
sense for certain prominent companies. Analysts rated Wal-Mart Stores, Target 
Corporation, and Southwest Airlines as having a low-price strategy. Apple was 
rated low on low prices and high on innovation, whereas Dell and Gateway 
were rated high on low prices and low on innovation. Furthermore, companies 
that followed the same strategy differed predictably along other dimensions. 
For example, Dell was among the highest-ranked companies on execution, 
whereas Gateway was among those ranked lowest. 
                                                 
4For 52 observations, we were unable to determine whether the analyst worked for the buy side 
or the sell side. 6 
Table 2 reports the response frequencies for the survey variables that we 
used in our study. For almost all questions, analysts consistently favored the 
top three ratings. As a result, the median rating was 4 (out of 5) for 11 of the 
16 variables and 3 for the remainder. Variables with high frequencies of 4 and 
5 included strategy communication, strategy execution, management quality, 
understanding of competitors, forecasted industry growth, superior 
products/services strategy, and balance sheet strength. Variables with 
relatively high frequencies of 1 and 2 included all the forecasted financial and 
stock performance metrics, strategy communication, high performance 
standards, low-price strategy, and industry competitiveness. 
Table 3 shows simple pairwise Pearson correlations between the survey 
variables. Not surprisingly, the correlations are sizable and statistically 
significant across many variables. Ratings of the various measures of 
companies’ forecasted performance (revenue growth, gross margins, earnings 
growth, and stock price appreciation) are highly correlated. Ratings of such 
qualitative capabilities as management quality, strategy execution, innovation, 
governance, strategy communication, culture, incentives, and financial 
strength are also highly correlated. 
In contrast, the industry factor and competitive positioning correlations 
vary in magnitude. Although ratings of industry competitiveness and company 
price competitiveness are not highly correlated with any of the other survey 
variables, ratings of forecasted industry growth and superior product/service 
strategy have correlations that are typically significant both statistically and 
economically. 
Tests and Results 
We report our results of tests conducted to assess which factors affect analyst 
forecasts and whether there is consistency in factor ratings across analysts 
who cover the same company.  7 
Factors Associated with Analyst Forecasts. 
We used our first test to estimate the relationship between analysts’ 
ratings of company revenue growth, gross margin, earnings growth, and stock 
price appreciation forecasts and their ratings of the industry, strategy, 
leadership, and financial resources variables. Given the ordinal nature of the 
dependent variables, we estimated the relationship between forecast 
performance and the independent variables by using an ordered probit model 
(see Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay 1997). 
To assess how the surveyed factors affect forecasted performance relative 
to actual current performance, we estimated models that include and exclude 
current performance for each forecast variable.5 Actual revenue growth is the 
percentage change in revenues for the current fiscal year. Gross margin is the 
current year’s gross profit as a percentage of sales. Earnings growth is defined 
as the change in earnings per share for the year deflated by the stock price at 
the beginning of the year. Earnings changes are deflated by stock price, rather 
than by prior-year earnings, because some companies have small or negative 
prior-year earnings, which leads to earnings growth that is exploding, 
undefined, or misleading. Finally, stock price appreciation is the percentage 
change in stock price for the latest fiscal year. 
Our tests included time, geographic region, and industry fixed effects to 
control for systematic differences in companies and analysts across these 
dimensions. To control for serial correlation within companies, we clustered 
standard errors at the company level. 
Table 4 reports the estimated coefficients for the ordered probit models 
that include and exclude current performance. Not surprisingly, current 
performance is typically related to the forecast ratings. More importantly, 
                                                 
5Prior studies have documented that the sign and magnitude of forecast revisions are positively 
associated with the sign and magnitude of past stock returns (Givoly and Lakonishok 1979; 
Lys and Sohn 1990; Abarbanell 1991). 8 
estimates for the other variables are generally unaffected by the inclusion or 
exclusion of this control.6 
The most important explanatory variable across all models is forecasted 
industry growth. The estimates for this variable are both statistically and 
economically significant. A two-point Likert scale increase in an analyst’s rating 
of a company’s industry growth increases the probability that forecasted 
revenue growth is rated 4 by 13.4 percentage points (pps) (from 42.9 percent to 
56.3 percent) and almost doubles the probability of a rating of 5 (from 10.3 
percent to 20.5 percent).7 Comparable increases in industry growth ratings also 
increase the probability that analysts issue ratings of 4 or 5 for gross margins, 
earnings growth, and stock price appreciation. The magnitudes (ranging from 
6.3 percent to 9.6 pps), however, are somewhat lower than those for revenue 
growth. 
The next two most important explanatory variables are quality of top 
management and ability to execute strategy. Both are statistically and 
economically significant across all four forecast models. For quality of top 
management, a two-point Likert scale increase in an analyst’s rating of a 
company increases the likelihood that the analyst issued a forecast rating of 4 
by 6.1 pps for revenue growth, 6.2 pps for gross margins, 7.5 pps for earnings 
growth, and 7.3 pps for stock appreciation. Comparable effects for strategy 
execution are 8 pps for revenue growth, 6 pps for gross margins, 6 pps for 
earnings growth, and 3.7 pps for stock appreciation. 
The estimates for performance-driven culture and industry 
competitiveness are significant for models of forecasted financial performance 
(revenue growth, earnings growth, and gross margins) but not for stock price 
appreciation. The estimates imply that increasing an analyst’s rating of a 
                                                 
6Using an alternative approach, we estimated the models separately for companies that 
analysts rated as having clear strategies (based on price or product/service differentiation). 
These findings are similar to those reported in Table 4. 
7Because we used an ordered probit as the specification, a different marginal effect is 
associated with each level of the dependent variable. 9 
company’s performance-driven culture by two points increases the likelihood 
that the analyst gives the company’s future revenue growth, gross margins, 
and earnings growth a rating of 4 by 6.4 pps, 7.1 pps, and 4.2 pps, 
respectively. Comparable effects for industry competitiveness are –5.5 pps, –4.8 
pps, and –4.3 pps, which suggests that analysts are less optimistic about the 
prospects of companies in industries where supplier power, price competition, 
new products, and entry are expected to increase. 
Estimates for ratings on innovation and low-price strategy are also 
significant for the three growth forecast models (revenues, earnings, and stock 
prices). Increasing an analyst’s rating of a company’s low-price variable by two 
points increases the likelihood of a forecast rating of 4 by 4.8 pps for revenue 
growth, 3.6 pps for earnings growth, and 4.3 pps for stock price growth. The 
effects for innovation are similar in magnitude.8 
The economic importance of the industry growth/competitiveness and 
company capability variables for analyst forecasts is consistent with money 
manager feedback on sell-side analysts. In ratings of sell-side analyst research, 
money managers consistently rank analysts’ assessments of industry 
dynamics, companies’ strategic positioning, and companies’ internal 
capabilities as among their most important contributions (see Institutional 
Investor 2001). In addition, the importance of analyst perceptions of 
management quality to future performance probably explains why money 
managers value sell-side analysts’ ability to organize events where they have 
the opportunity to meet and evaluate corporate executives privately or in small 
groups (Institutional Investor, 2001). 
Note that estimates for analyst ratings of governance, strategy 
communication, superior product/service strategy, financial strength, and 
understanding of competitors are generally statistically insignificant and have 
weak economic effects. The finding on governance is particularly interesting 
                                                 
8Using only observations from analysts who provided usable responses for three companies, we 
re-estimated all the models. The results are very similar to those reported here. 10 
given the regulatory efforts to improve governance through the Sarbanes–Oxley 
Act of 2002. Several possible explanations come to mind. One is that analysts 
perceive little difference in governance across the companies they cover. 
Alternatively, judging which companies have effective governance may be 
difficult for analysts because outsiders cannot easily determine whether boards 
are actively debating critical management strategies and empowering internal 
and external auditors to assess whether risks are well managed. 
Note also that strategy communication ratings are insignificant for buy-
side and sell-side analysts combined. These results, however, are driven by the 
results for buy-side analysts. In separate tests for sell-side analysts, we found 
that communication ratings are significantly related to forecasts of accounting 
and stock market performance. Buy-side analysts placed greater weight on the 
quality of top management in their forecasts of earnings growth and stock 
market performance than did sell-side analysts. 
Given the high correlations among the independent variables, we 
examined whether multicollinearity is a concern by using a test developed by 
Belsley, Kuh, and Welsh (1980). The results indicate that multicollinearity is 
not a serious problem for our estimates. 
Overall, the industry, management, and company factors explain roughly 
12–17 percent of the variation in analyst forecasts. Given the importance of the 
constructs surveyed, this percentage reflects a rather low explanatory power. 
One possible reason is that considerable variation exists in the relative 
importance of factors across industries, and the failure to reflect that variation 
in the panel data affects the estimated coefficients and the models’ explanatory 
power. To test for this possibility, we re-estimated the models across 10 
industry groups by using Thomson Reuters Datastream’s industry/sector 
specifications: information technology, general industrials, financials, cyclical 
services, cyclical consumer goods, basic industries, noncyclical services, 
noncyclical consumer goods, natural resources, and utilities. The average 
pseudo-R2 for the earnings growth models is 21 percent, ranging from a low of 11 
12 percent for information technology and noncyclical services to a high of 34 
percent for natural resources. These results represent a modest increase over 
the aggregate results. 
Another possible explanation is variation in the relative importance of 
factors across geographic regions. The average explanatory power, however, did 
not increase when we re-estimated the models across four regions: North 
America, Europe, Asia, and Latin America. 
In summary, these results suggest that analyst forecasts of corporate 
performance are consistently related to their assessments of industry growth 
and competitiveness, leadership and cultural capabilities (leadership quality 
and performance-driven culture), company capabilities (strategy execution and 
innovation), and strategy choice (price competitiveness). 
Consistency of Analysts’ Ratings within Companies. 
We next examined whether financial experts who cover the same 
company have common perceptions of its future performance, core qualitative 
capabilities, and industry dynamics. Much has been written about consistency 
among analysts’ earnings forecasts (O’Brien 1988; Brown 1991). Factors that 
can lead to forecast consistency include analysts’ ability to extrapolate from 
public historical information about a company, their ability to benchmark their 
forecasts with public forecasts issued by other analysts, and their incentives to 
herd (see Trueman 1994; Graham 1999; Hong, Kubik, and Solomon 2000; 
Clement and Tse 2005; Clarke and Subramanian 2006). 
Such qualitative factors as industry dynamics, leadership, and company 
capabilities have also been proposed as relevant to company performance. As 
noted earlier, money managers view analysts’ assessments of industry 
dynamics, companies’ strategic positioning, and companies’ internal 
capabilities as among their most important research contributions (see 
Institutional Investor 2001), which suggests that they believe analysts are able 12 
to identify company variations credibly. Yet little evidence on this matter exists. 
Is reliably measuring such factors straightforward or difficult for analysts? 
To examine the consistency of analysts’ ratings on our survey questions, 
we estimated intraclass correlation statistics for each question by using a 














where MSbf is the mean squares between companies, MSwf is the mean squares 
within companies, and k is the number of companies.9 The correlation 
measures the average consistency of the ratings of analysts who cover the 
same company and, in theory, can range from 1 (perfect consistency) to 0 (no 
consistency). Bliese (2000) noted that for applied field research, estimates of 
0.05–0.20 are typical and estimates greater than 0.30 are unusual. 
To calculate intraclass correlation coefficients, we included only 
companies with responses from at least two analysts in a sample year.10 The 
usable sample comprised 784 company-years, for which the mean (median) 
coverage was four (three) analysts.11 
Table 5 reports the weighted average intraclass correlations for both 
surveys, with the weights being the number of observations in each survey. The 
correlations range from 0.15 to 0.415, which suggests considerable variation 
across survey questions in consistency among analysts covering the same 
company. The highest correlations are for forecasted revenue growth (0.415), 
balance sheet strength (0.414), strategy execution (0.382), and clear 
communication of strategy (0.345). The high correlations for balance sheet 
                                                 
9For an extensive discussion of statistics for inter-rater agreement, see Shrout and Fleiss 
(1979) and Fleiss (1981). 
10We performed our analysis separately for each sample year (2005 and 2006) and then 
aggregated the results to allow for time-varying correlations. 
11Including only companies covered by more than four analysts yielded similar results. 13 
strength and strategy communication are not surprising given that they reflect 
publicly available information. Strategy execution is also likely to be highly 
correlated with current performance. But why there is greater analyst 
consistency for forecasted revenues than for forecasted earnings or gross 
margins is unclear. 
The correlations are lowest for industry competitiveness (0.15), 
forecasted stock appreciation (0.171), low-price strategy (0.195), and expected 
high standards (0.206). The low correlation for forecasted stock appreciation is 
not surprising. If markets are relatively efficient, considerable disagreement is 
likely over whether a stock is expected to increase or decrease in value, giving 
rise to inconsistent recommendation ratings and a low correlation. But the low 
correlations for low-price strategy and industry competitiveness are puzzling 
because strategies for many companies (e.g., Dell, Wal-Mart, Apple) and the 
competitiveness of their industries should be transparent to all analysts who 
cover them. 
Note that buy-side analysts’ assessments of companies’ qualitative 
characteristics and future performance are significantly less consistent than 
sell-side analysts’ assessments. The average intraclass correlation coefficient 
for buy-side analysts is 23 percent, compared with 34 percent for sell-side 
analysts. One explanation for this finding is that sell-side analysts face 
pressure to issue similar assessments to peers covering the same company. 
After all, one would be hard put to blame a sell-side analyst for issuing a rating 
that ends up losing money if others made the same mistake. In contrast, many 
buy-side analysts are encouraged to take positions in opposition to the sell 
side, leading to less consistency in their ratings (see Groysberg, Healy, and 
Chapman 2008). 
To assess whether analysts are more likely to be consistent on financial 
forecasts than on company capabilities, we examined the average estimates for 
both categories. We found little evidence that analysts agree more on financial 
forecasts than on internal capabilities. The average correlation for performance 14 
forecasts is 28 percent (31.6 percent excluding the question on stock price 
forecast), versus 30.5 percent for the questions on internal capabilities (28 
percent excluding the questions on balance sheet strength and 
communication). In contrast, the average correlations for the competitive 
factors and the company strategy estimates are somewhat lower: 22.1 percent 
and 24.5 percent, respectively. 
In summary, our findings suggest that considerable variation in 
consistency exists among analysts who cover the same company for many of 
the variables surveyed. Not surprisingly, factors that reflect public information 
tend to have greater consistency. And sell-side analysts have greater 
consistency than buy-side analysts, perhaps reflecting their differing 
incentives. Consistency is relatively low, however, for questions on low-price 
strategy and industry competitiveness, which is troubling because both money 
managers and prior research suggest that those factors are important drivers 
of companies’ future performance. 
Conclusion 
In our study, we used survey data to examine which industry, company, and 
leadership factors are related to analyst forecasts of company performance. 
Because many of the factors we surveyed are subjective, we also tested whether 
analysts who cover the same company make consistent assessments of those 
factors. 
We found that many of the factors that money managers rate as 
important in their assessments of analyst contributions are strongly related to 
analyst forecasts of company performance. These include industry factors 
(notably, industry growth and competitiveness), leadership factors (top 
management quality), and company capabilities (in particular, strategy 
execution, innovation, and performance-driven culture). We found no evidence 
that analysts consider governance an important factor in their forecasts, 
despite recent regulatory changes and public focus. We suspect that despite 15 
the changes, assessing the quality of a company’s board deliberations remains 
difficult for analysts. Finally, we detected systematic differences between buy-
side and sell-side analysts. Sell-side (but not buy-side) forecasts are related to 
strategy communication, and buy-side forecasts are related to management 
quality. 
Considerable variation in ratings consistency exists among analysts who 
cover the same company. Factors with the highest consistency ratings include 
revenue forecasts, strategy execution, strategy communication, and balance 
sheet strength. Factors with the lowest consistency ratings include forecasted 
stock performance, industry competitiveness, and low-price strategy. We are 
puzzled by the fact that analysts who cover the same company show such little 
consistency in their ratings of industry competitiveness and low-price strategy; 
these factors would seem to be easily identifiable, at least for many companies. 
Consistency is significantly lower for buy-side analysts than for their sell-side 
peers, perhaps reflecting stronger sell-side incentives to herd. We found no 
evidence that analysts are more consistent on financial forecast factors (where 
they can use historical results and other analyst forecasts as benchmarks) 
than on internal capability factors (where no such benchmarks are readily 
available). 
Despite the usual limitations of surveys, we believe our findings are likely 
to interest scholars, educators, and practitioners. Our findings confirm many 
predictions about the relevance for future performance of certain factors 
concerning industry dynamics, strategic choices, and company capabilities, 
and they underscore the importance of analysts’ building a strong 
understanding of a company’s industry and its qualitative capabilities. 
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Author Online Summary 
Although extensive research has been conducted on analysts’ earnings 
forecasts and recommendations, relatively little has been written about the 
factors that underlie them. In our study, we examined which industry, 
leadership, and company factors are related to analysts’ forecasts of financial 
and stock performance. We also examined whether analysts covering the same 
company make consistent assessments of its industry, leadership, and 
company capabilities. 
To study these questions, we used data from a survey of 967 analysts who 
rated 837 companies on their projected future performance, industry 
economics, company capabilities, and leadership. Analysts were asked to 
provide forecasts of growth in revenues, earnings, and stock price, as well as 
gross margins, for up to three companies they covered. For each company, they 
were also asked to rate industry, company, and leadership factors that prior 
research suggests influence future performance. These factors include the 
competitiveness and growth of each company’s industry, whether it competes 
primarily on the basis of innovation or price, its strategy execution and 
communication, its innovativeness, existing financial resources, the quality of 
its top management, whether management sets high performance standards, 
and its governance. 
We found a strong relationship between analysts’ forecasts of a company’s 
performance and their assessments of its industry growth, industry 
competition, quality of its management, commitment to high performance 17 
expectations, ability to execute strategy, and innovation. We found that several 
factors are generally unimportant, including governance, transparent strategy 
communication (especially for buy-side analysts), competition via superior 
products/services, financial strength, and understanding one’s competitors. 
Considerable variation in ratings consistency exists across factors among 
analysts who cover the same company. Analyst ratings are relatively more 
consistent for company revenue forecasts, balance sheet strength, strategy 
execution, and strategy communication than for industry competitiveness, 
forecasted stock appreciation, low-price strategy, and understanding one’s 
competitors. Consistency is significantly higher for sell-side analysts than for 
their buy-side peers, perhaps reflecting sell-side pressure to herd. Finally, we 
found no evidence that analysts are more consistent on financial forecast 
factors than on internal capability factors. 
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Exhibit 1. Analyst Survey Questions 
Question 
No.  Question 
Variable 
Name 
  Industry performance   
  In the next 12 months, how likely are the following in each company’s 
business environment: 
 
1  a. Demand growth greater than GDP growth?  IG 
2  b. Greater price competition?  ICOMP
a 
3  c. Higher input prices?  ICOMP
a 
4  d. Threat of new products?  ICOMP
a 
5  e. Entry of new players?  ICOMP
a 
     
  Financial performance and investment prospects   
  Relative to its peers, how do you expect the company to perform during the 
next 12 months on the following dimensions: 
 
6  a. Revenue growth?  FRG 
7  b. Gross margin?  FGM 
8  c. Earnings growth?  FEG 
9  d. Stock price appreciation?  FSG 
     
  Company strategy   
10  Relative to its peers, does the company have a clear and well-communicated 
strategy? 
SCLR 
  Relative to its peers, how compelling is the company’s value proposition for 
its customers on each of these dimensions: 
 
11  a. Low prices?   LPR 
12  b. Superior products?   DIFF
b 
13  c. Superior service?   DIFF
b 
     
  Qualitative capabilities   
14  Relative to its peers, how well does the company operationalize and execute 
against its strategy? 
SEXEC 
15  Relative to its peers, how often is the company at the leading edge of 
innovation in its industry? 
INNOV 
16  Relative to its peers, how strong is the company’s top management team?  MGT 
17  Relative to its peers, how good is the company’s governance?  GOV 
18  Relative to its peers, how well does the company understand its competitors 
and their relative strengths and weaknesses? 
COMP 
19  Relative to its peers, how demanding are the performance standards of the 
company? 
PSTD 
     
  Financial resources   
20  Relative to its peers, how strong is the company’s balance sheet?  FSTR 
aIndustry competitiveness (ICOMP) is an analyst’s average rating for Questions 2–5. 
bSuperior products/services strategy (DIFF) is an analyst’s maximum rating for Questions 12 and 13.   23 
Table 1. Summary of Survey Responses by Geographic Region and Industry 
  Observations    Companies 
  Number 
Percentage of 
Sample    Number 
Percentage of 
Sample 
Geographic region           
United States  1,170  53.7%    356  42.5% 
Europe  598  27.4    234  28.0 
Asia Pacific  330  15.1    192  22.9 
Latin America  81  3.7    55  6.6 
Total  2,179  100.0%    837  100.0% 
             
Industries           
Basic industries  124  5.7%    61  7.3% 
Cyclical consumer goods  98  4.5    38  4.5 
Cyclical services  272  12.5    110  13.1 
Financials  543  24.9    189  22.6 
General industrials  137  6.3    61  7.3 
Information technology  394  18.1    101  12.1 
Noncyclical consumer goods  328  15.1    126  15.1 
Noncyclical services  140  6.4    62  7.4 
Natural resources  78  3.3    49  5.9 
Utilities  65  3.0    40  4.8 
Total  2,179  100.0%    837  100.0% 
Note: The sample comprises 2,179 responses for 837 companies by 967 analysts surveyed between December 2004 
and April 2005 and between March 2006 and July 2006. 
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Table 2. Frequency Statistics for Dependent and Independent Variables 
  Percentage of Responses Rated As 
Variable  1  2  3  4  5 
Forecasted revenue growth (FRG)  4.1%  14.4%  28.9%  36.6%  16.0% 
Forecasted gross margin (FGM)  2.0  13.9  35.5  36.3  12.3 
Forecasted earnings growth (FEG)  2.9  12.4  29.1  38.8  16.8 
Forecasted stock appreciation (FSG)  3.6  13.8  31.3  36.4  15.0 
Clear, well-communicated strategy (SCLR)  3.8  12.7  22.7  34.4  26.6 
Ability to execute strategy (STRATEX)  3.1  10.9  25.0  38.2  22.8 
Governance strength (GOV)  4.9  11.8  36.2  31.3  15.8 
Quality of top management (MGT)  1.8  11.0  28.0  38.2  21.0 
Innovation leader (INNOV)  3.7  11.9  29.2  35.7  19.5 
Low-price strategy (LPR)  9.1  22.8  42.2  17.8  8.2 
Superior products/services strategy (DIFF)  0.8  4.8  24.3  41.0  29.1 
Balance sheet strength (FSTR)  3.5  9.0  24.3  29.7  33.4 
High performance standards (PSTD)  2.8  13.1  42.8  34.0  7.3 
Understands competitors (COMP)  1.6  7.6  28.9  38.9  23.0 
Forecasted industry growth (IG)  3.8  12.1  25.6  33.8  24.8 
Industry competitiveness (ICOMP)  1.6  22.3  52.0  22.0  2.1 
Notes: Industry growth (IG) is the rating to the question whether industry demand is expected to 
grow faster than GDP growth (Question 1). Industry competitiveness (ICOMP) is the analyst’s average 
rating for Questions 2–5, which deal with whether the analyst expects higher price competition, 
higher input prices, and increased threats from new products and/or competitors in the next 12 
months. Strategic clarity (SCLR) is the rating for Question 10, which asks the analyst whether the 
company has a clear strategy that is well communicated. The two strategic positioning variables are 
LPR, representing the rating for Question 11 (whether the company’s value proposition is low prices), 
and DIFF, which is the analyst’s maximum rating for Questions 12 and 13 (whether the company’s 
value proposition is superior products/services). Strategy execution (STRATEX) is the rating for 
Question 14, which asks the analyst to assess how well a company executes its strategy. Innovation 
(INNOV) is the analyst’s rating for Question 15, which asks how often the company is at the leading 
edge of innovation in its industry. Note that innovation includes both process and product/service 
innovation and is thus not merely another proxy for company strategy. MGT is the analyst’s rating of 
the quality of top management (Question 16). Governance (GOV) is captured by the rating for 
Question 17 (the quality of the company’s governance). Understanding one’s competitors (COMP) is 
captured by the rating for Question 18 (the company’s understanding of the strengths and 
weaknesses of its competitors). High performance standards (PSTD) is captured by the rating for 
Question 19 (the extent to which the company’s performance standards are demanding). Financial 
strength (FSTR) is captured by Question 20 (the strength of the company’s balance sheet).  25 
Table 3. Pearson Correlations between Survey Responses 
Variable  FRG  FGM  FEG  FSG  SCLR   STRATEX  GOV  MGT  INNOV  LPR  DIFF  FSTR  PSTD  COMP  IG 
Forecasted revenue growth (FRG)  1.00                             
Forecasted gross margin (FGM)  0.54  1.00                           
Forecasted earnings growth (FEG)  0.65  0.57  1.00                         
Forecasted stock appreciation (FSG)  0.51  0.46  0.59  1.00                       
Clear, well-communicated strategy (SCLR)  0.42  0.37  0.38  0.35  1.00                     
Ability to execute strategy (STRATEX)  0.50  0.42  0.45  0.39  0.64  1.00                   
Governance strength (GOV)  0.26  0.27  0.28  0.27  0.44  0.43  1.00                 
Quality of top management (MGT)  0.45  0.42  0.44  0.40  0.58  0.64  0.51  1.00               
Innovation leader (INNOV)  0.40  0.33  0.35  0.31  0.43  0.46  0.33  0.47  1.00             
Low-price strategy (LPR)  0.12  0.06  0.11  0.12  0.06  0.10  0.05  0.05  –0.02  1.00           
Superior products/services strategy (DIFF)  0.34  0.32  0.31  0.28  0.42  0.45  0.33  0.43  0.48  –0.04  1.00         
Balance sheet strength (FSTR)  0.28  0.32  0.27  0.26  0.36  0.41  0.36  0.42  0.30  –0.01  0.32  1.00       
High performance standards (PSTD)  0.43  0.40  0.39  0.33  0.55  0.61  0.49  0.59  0.51  0.07  0.43  0.35  1.00     
Understands competitors (COMP)  0.42  0.37  0.37  0.32  0.54  0.58  0.40  0.56  0.45  0.09  0.41  0.35  0.54  1.00   
Forecasted industry growth (IG)  0.41  0.33  0.35  0.31  0.24  0.30  0.19  0.27  0.27  0.03  0.28  0.24  0.26  0.24  1.00 
Industry competitiveness (ICOMP)  –0.12  –0.08  –0.09  –0.08  –0.05  –0.06  –0.03  –0.04  –0.02  –0.01  0.02  –0.04  0.01  –0.06  –0.04 
Notes: The reported Pearson correlations (based on ratings) are virtually identical to Spearman (rank) correlations. Correlations 
greater than 0.05 or less than –0.05 are significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level. 26 
Table 4. Relationship between Analysts’ Forecasts of Company Performance and Their Ratings of Industry 
Factors, Company Strategy, and Company Capabilities 
  Results without Control for Current Performance 
 
Results with Control for Current Performance 
  Revenue Growth  Gross Margin  Earnings Growth  Stock Growth 
 
Revenue Growth  Gross Margin  Earnings Growth  Stock Growth 
Clear, well-communicated strategy 
(SCLR)  0.075*  0.048  0.047  0.077** 
 
0.061  0.078*  0.057  0.075* 
Ability to execute strategy (STRATEX)  0.212**  0.096*  0.180**  0.113** 
 
0.183**  0.135**  0.166**  0.094* 
Governance strength (GOV)  –0.070  –0.020  –0.010  0.016 
 
–0.100**  –0.050  –0.030  0.017 
Quality of top management (MGT)  0.141**  0.152**  0.201**  0.199** 
 
0.141**  0.138**  0.204**  0.182** 
Innovation leader (INNOV)  0.137**  0.038  0.094**  0.077* 
 
0.136**  0.060  0.105**  0.105** 
Low-price strategy (LPR)  0.109**  0.033  0.097**  0.105** 
 
0.110**  0.048  0.097**  0.107** 
Superior products/services strategy 
(DIFF)  0.048  0.083*  0.041  0.043 
 
0.073  0.072  0.059  0.044 
Balance sheet strength (FSTR)  0.016  0.111**  0.019  0.041 
 
0.006  0.078*  0.008  0.033 
High performance standards (PSTD)  0.142**  0.163**  0.099**  0.027 
 
0.149**  0.155**  0.116*  0.034 
Understands competitors (COMP)  0.105*  0.091*  0.049  0.012 
 
0.121**  0.084  0.045  0.008 
Forecasted industry growth (IG)  0.301**  0.206**  0.230**  0.184** 
 
0.287**  0.184**  0.236**  0.180** 
Industry competitiveness (ICOMP)  –0.140**  –0.080*  –0.100**  –0.090* 
 
–0.120**  –0.100*  –0.110**  –0.070 
Current performance         
 
0.937**  0.003*  0.002  0.288** 
Pseudo-R
2  16.54%  12.49%  13.22%  9.92% 
 
16.77%  12.55%  13.28%  9.82% 
Number of observations  2,162  2,126  2,170  2,137 
 
1,965  1,499  1,812  1,964 
Notes: This table shows estimates of coefficients for an ordered probit model with and without current performance as a control 
variable. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity. 
*Significant at the 5 percent level. 
**Significant at the 1 percent level. 
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Forecasts   
Forecasted revenue growth (FRG)  41.5% 
Forecasted gross margin (FGM)  24.9 
Forecasted earnings growth (FEG)  28.4 
Forecasted stock appreciation (FSG)  17.1 
Average   28.0% 
   
Competitive factors   
Forecasted industry growth (IG)  29.1% 
Industry competitiveness (ICOMP)  15.0 
Average   22.1% 
   
Company strategy   
Low-price strategy (LPR)  19.5% 
Superior products/services strategy (DIFF)  29.5 
Average   24.5% 
   
Internal capabilities   
Clear, well-communicated strategy (SCLR)  34.5% 
Ability to execute strategy (STRATEX)  38.2 
Innovation leader (INNOV)  31.0 
Quality of top management (MGT)  24.1 
Governance strength (GOV)  28.0 
Balance sheet strength (FSTR)  41.4 
Understands competitors (COMP)  20.6 
High performance standards (PSTD)  25.8 
Average   30.4% 
   
Comparison of buy-side and sell-side analysts   
Buy-side analysts  23.1% 
Sell-side analysts  34.0 
Notes: We computed the intraclass correlation coefficient for every question in the survey. We 
included all companies that were ranked by at least two analysts to ensure variation both 
within and between companies. Average correlations are weighted averages of the estimates for 
the 2004–05 and 2006 surveys, weighted by the number of observations in each survey. 